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1
INTRODUCTION
The major drivers of forest loss in Zambia are well
documented as agricultural expansion, charcoal
production, fuelwood collection, wood harvesting,
human settlements, fires, urbanization and urban
expansion, industrialization and livestock grazing.1 But
these factors are symptoms of the key underlying
drivers which are; high levels of  poverty,  low
employment opportunities, brick-making, tobacco
curing, insecure forest and land tenure (who owns and
controls the land), low institutional capacity of the
Forestry Department (FD) as a result of poor funding,
low staffing levels, lack of reliable transport for
monitoring, and lack of synergy among policies and
legislation.2  That these trends are still on the rise
despite an ostensibly good and progressive legal/
regulatory framework,3 justifies the need for an
empirical examination of the effectiveness,
responsiveness and coherence of Forestry law and
regulation in Zambia. As argued that law and regulation
perpetuate a historical regulatory culture of the state,
examining it can only be sufficient by analyzing the
pattern of its evolution.
Therefore, the paper undertakes a critical analysis of
the interrelationships among three factors used to
assess the efficiency of a regulatory system –
effectiveness, responsiveness and coherence. The paper
builds on the field of empirical legal inquiry in which
the practical aspect of the law is critically assessed in the
real world against societal values outside of statutes
and regulatory instruments.4 This also explains the
volume of non-legal literature reviewed and document
analysis undertaken from the materials written by, and
consultations with, technical experts in the forestry
sector.
The paper starts by examining the letter and spirit of
the Forests Act 1973 and the social context which was
targeted by the legal text and regulatory machinery.
The paper then proceeds to look at the Forests Act of
1999, legislation that was never implemented. But the
analysis of this defunct statute will be based on its
history and the future it was espoused to influence. At
the end, the paper discusses the Forests Act of 2015
and analyzes the current regulatory trilemma which
the law brings to the fore mirrored against societal
reality. The paper concludes that it is very unlikely that
current trends of forest degradation and deforestation
in Zambia can be decelerated without attention to the
regulatory trilemma in the law; effectiveness,
responsiveness and coherence of text to context. In
particular, the lack of attention to the regulatory
trilemma is itself symptomatic of the blindside of
the legacy of Command-and-Control (CAC)
regulation - a regulatory culture the state has, firstly,
inherited from its colonial past,5 and secondly, jealously
guarded in protecting and enforcing national values
of  forestry. But whether this regulatory culture is good
or bad is not part of the argument within the scope
of this paper. The gist of the paper is to analyze the
effects of this regulatory culture on the effectiveness,
responsiveness and coherence of the law in relation to
the socioeconomic context in which the law is being
enforced.
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1 Royd Vinya and others, Preliminary Study on the Drivers of
Deforestation and Potential for REDD+ in Zambia : A
Consultancy Report Prepared for the Forestry
Department and FAO under the National REDD+
Program in the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources
(FAO 2012) iv.
2  ibid iv.
3  That is, the Forests Act No. 4 of  2015 and its related
Statutory Instruments.
4   Hazel Genn and others, Law in the Real World: Improving our
Understanding of  How Law Works. Final Report and
Recommendations (The Nuffield Foundation 2006) iii.
5 Mwelwa C Musambachime, ‘Colonialism and the
Environment in Zambia, 1890 -1964’ in Samuel N
Chipungu (ed), Guardians in Their Time: Experiences of
Zambians under Colonial Rule, 1890-1964 (MacMillan Press
1992) 9-10.
2
THE FORESTS ACT NO 39 OF 1973
Law and policy both reflect the societal values, norms
and culture of the law and policy-makers.6  This is
clear throughout the evolution of forest law and
regulation in Zambia from the Forests Act 1973 to
the Forests Act 2015. While policy has been used to
define and elaborate these values, statutory law,
reinforced by secondary statutory instruments, has been
used to enforce and protect the values. In the midst
of  elaborating, enforcing and protecting the country’s
forestry values, attention to the elements of
effectiveness, coherence and responsiveness of the
legal/regulatory mechanisms used in enforcing and
protecting the same values has been lost.
After independence in 1964, the Government of the
First Republic of Zambia did everything within its
powers to assert national sovereignty and authority
over land and natural resources.7 Given that the control
of natural resources begins with authority over land,
as enacted in sections ten and nineteen of the Forests
Act 1973, the Presidential stewardship principle has
become the foundation of natural resource
management in Zambia.8 The principle has always
permeated forest management from the Forests Act
1973 to the Forests Acts 2015. If all land is vested in
the President, all trees that stand on state land, all
produce derived from forest, namely national and local
forests, must be vested in the President on behalf of
the Republic.9 Chungu rightly observes that this took
away opportunities for private ownership rights of
trees even where title to land was held.10 As such,
doors for private forest management were de facto
closed. From a regulatory ethos, the Presidential
stewardship principle lays the foundation for CAC
approach to forest regulation.
Through the Forests Act 1973, the state had assumed
the unilateral power to command (through legal rules)
and the responsibility to control (through
administrative procedures of statutory bodies) the
entire forestry sector in the country. Regulatory ethos
often sees this as a linear progressive approach that
proceeds from policy formulation to implementation,
rule-making to enforcement, and hence the term Direct
Regulation.11 An inevitable part of such control
involves land on which the forests stand. As such, the
Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ)
established a sub-category of landholding in
government reserve land for the protection of  public
natural resources like trees in national and local forests,
wildlife in national Parks and game management
areas.12 Essentially, forest law after independence in
Zambia was not tailored to solve any set of forestry-
related problems. It was rather one of the strategic
state mechanisms for asserting national sovereignty
over natural resources. The motivation to assert
national authority and sovereignty over natural
resources is discernable in the repeal of the colonial
Forests Act Cap 311 of the Laws of Northern
Rhodesia (Zambia before independence).
The Forests Act of 1973 was focused on protecting
forest catchment areas through the establishment of
national and local forests, to conserve and protect
forests and trees as sources of  timber, and thereby, to
regulate timber extraction through licensing as a key
regulatory technique.13 The foregoing purposes
constituted, in Chungu’s words, a conservationist and
protectionist spirit.14 But while the basis of being
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6  Stuart Bell and others, Environmental Law (8th edn, Oxford
University Press 2013) 12.
7  Paul Chungu, Evolution of Environmental Law in
Zambia: ‘A Paper Presented at the Judges’ Seminar on
Environmental Law’ Siavonga, December 2005, 3.
8 The President may, by purchase or compulsory
acquisition under the Lands Acquisition Act, acquire
any land for the purposes of National Forest, if he
considers it necessary or desirable in the public interest
so to do.
9  The Forests Act 1973, s 3.
 10  Chungu (n 7) 10.
 11  Bell and others (n 6) 229.
 12  Chungu (n 7) 4.
 13  The Forests Act 1973, preamble.
 14 Chungu (n 7) 8.
conservationist were somewhat clear, the
protectionist’s spirit was not clear. What were the forests
being protected from? While problems in the forestry
sector could have probably been anticipated in the
future, the legal regulatory system itself was not
designed to prevent foreseeable or unforeseeable
problems in the future?
Zambia’s problems in the forestry sector began to
emerge in the 1980s following the economic
depression of the 1970s.15 It is reported that forest
reserves suffered the greatest loss of  the time – from
an estimated 7.6 million to 7.3 million hectares,16
attributed to human encroachments and over-
exploitation of forest resources.17 The two problems
could explain themselves in that; encroachments are
purely community problems while over-exploitation
is a government-related problem created by attempts
to use forest resources (especially timber) to cushion
the effects of  a declining economy. This fact could not
have been appreciated and documented in the 1970s
but it could not be ignored later in the 1990s when
forests played a crucial role in the country’s economic
recovery program.18
Given the fact that the state demarcated forests as
national and local forests,19 or any other form of forest
protection that government would deem necessary to
prescribe at the time, the scope of forest protection
was, by default, limited to the ‘demarcated’ forest area
defined by the law. Outside of  the boundaries of
demarcated forests was a ‘coupe’, defined as ‘any site
or area for felling or taking of forest produce, whether
the boundaries thereof are demarcated on the ground
or not’.20 As a general principle, the law does not
protect what it has not defined or what has not been
captured within its precise boundaries.21 Therefore, it
is inferable within the spirit of the Forests Act of
1973 that the coupe were not legally protected areas.
No license under Part VII, no permit or any form of
regulatory authorization such as timber marking were
required for felling, cutting and/or removing forest
produce from the coupe under the law. Hence the
coupe system became de facto open access areas which
began to suffer the tragedy of the commons during
the economic recession of the 1970s.22 This should
explain the subsequent problem of encroachments in
the ‘demarcated’ forests (protected areas) as
communities, driven by their pressing socioeconomic
needs, shifted their focus from their depleted forests
in the coupe system in to the protected forests.
Given that 88 per cent of the legally ‘demarcated forests’
under GRZ protection was on traditional land at the
time,23 it also meant that these forests were located in
local community areas. This fact is implicit from section
sixty seven of the Act albeit local communities were
fenced off from the same demarcated or protected
forests.24 According to the thinking of section sixty
seven, the only role these communities could play in
forest management was to respond to forest
emergencies such as forest fires.25 This was a legally
positive obligation rather than a community discretion
to help through participation. Understandably
however, the assumptions of the policy and law-
makers then could have been informed by a belief
that the traditional systems were well-placed and strong
enough to deal with regulation of forest resources
under the coupe system. But the problem of
deforestation and forest degradation later on proved
that this assumption was wrong. It also exposed the
weaknesses of the classical regulatory orthodoxy of
CAC which is based on the deterrence theory that
assumes an adversarial and antagonistic relationship
between state regulators and those targeted by the
regulations.26
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 15  ibid 8-9.
 16  ibid 9.
 17  ibid 9.
 18  Patrick W Matakala, ILUA II Technical Report Series
     2016: ZFAP Preparatory Review (FAO, Ministry for
     Foreign Affairs of Finland, and the Forestry
       Department, 2016) 6.
19   The Forests Act 1973, s 2.
 20  ibid s 2.
 21 Sir Robert Jennings, foreword in Philippe Sands and
     Jacqueline Peel, Principles of International Environmental
     Law  (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press 2012) xxvii.
22   Matakala (n 18) 22.
23  Chungu (n 7) 10.
24  The Forests Act 1973, s 67.
25  ibid.
26  Christine Parker and John Braithwaite, ‘Regulation’ in
       Peter Cane and Mark Tushnet (eds), The Oxford Handbook
     of Legal Studies (Oxford University Press 2003) 129.
The tragedy of the communal commons under the
coupe system was also a reflection of the effects of the
thinking of the time. Seeing no link between
environment and development in the 1970s, most
African governments saw environmental problems as
issues of developed countries and not challenges of
developing countries.27 With a biased focus on
industrialization at the expense of environmental
protection, Zambia was slowly falling into two self-
dug pits; firstly, a development crisis caused by over-
borrowing to finance industrial development which
also culminated in an economic decline due to a rapid
fall in copper prices; and secondly, an environmental
crisis which the government did not see or simply
chose to ignore.28 While the lack of forest regulation
in the coupe system compounded the environmental
crisis, the legal/regulatory mechanism in the sector was
neither designed to address nor to respond to current,
foreseeable and/or unforeseeable problems in the
sector.
How effective, therefore, was the Forests Act 1973?
Firstly, from the perspective of  effectiveness, the law
was inept and blunt in the face of problems it was
never designed to solve or respond to. As such, the
regulatory infrastructure crumbled in the face of
unforeseen complex societal realities. Secondly, in terms
of coherence, the law was viewed to be inconsistent
with the land tenure system.29 While state land is
reported to have constituted only 6 per cent of the
entire land at the time, 88 per cent of all government
legally demarcated forests stood on customary land
under traditional rulers.30 This created a conflict of
jurisdiction between the FD and traditional rulers.31
Consequently, it was easy for the local communities to
violate the law willy-nilly because traditional authorities
and their communities were either not aware of the
law, having been excluded from the formulation of
the law in question,32 or because the law itself was the
cause of jurisdictional conflict over land and forest
estate. Thirdly, from the perspective of  responsiveness,
how does a regulatory system respond to complex
socio-economic realities to which the law was never
designed to respond in the first place? In addition, the
FD as the sole GRZ regulator hasn’t had both financial
and technical capacity to undertake such highly skilled
assessments as monitoring the communities’
responsiveness to the law. This institutional incapacity
has remained a fundamental issue to date. Essentially,
the Forests Act 1973 became ineffective because of its
unresponsiveness.
Ultimately, much of  the ineffectiveness of  the Forests
Act 1973 and its dominant CAC regulation were
attributed to a combination of regulatory factors; (i)
reliance on inappropriate regulatory instruments
leading to what is known as instrument failure,33 (ii)
lack of sufficient information about the problems
being regulated leading to what is known as
information failure,34 (iii) poor enforcement on the
part of the regulators leading to what is known as
implementation failure,35 and (iv) motivation failure
– meaning, those being regulated are not motivated
enough to comply with the rules.36 Logic then posits
that motivation failure is determined by the extents to
which people view the coherence of the law to their
societal needs. It then follows that motivation failure
occurs when the targeted population sees no rationality
in complying with the rules. Put together, these factors
define regulatory failure in general but separated, they
depict the major demerits of CAC in particular. Hence,
the regulatory system attempted to respond in 1999
as follows:
Evolution of  Forest Law and Regulation in Zambia from 1973 to 2015
44
27 Bertha Osei-Hweidie, ‘Environmental Protection and
Economic Development in Zambia’ (1996) 11(2) Journal
of Social Development in Africa 57, 58.
28 ibid 58.
29 Chungu (n 7) 10.
30 ibid.
31 ibid.
32 ibid.
33 Julia Black, ‘Decentring Regulation: Understanding the
Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a Post-
Regulatory World’ [2001] Current Legal Problems 103,
104-7.
34 ibid 105.
35 ibid 105-106.
36 ibid 106-107.
implementation of the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Flora and Fauna, the
Convention on Wetlands of
International Importance Especially as
Water Fowl Habitat, the Convention
on Biological Diversity and the
Convention to Combat Desertification
in those Countries Experiencing
Serious Drought and/or
Desertification, particularly in Africa; to
repeal the Forests Act, 1973; and to
provide for matters connected with or
incidental to the foregoing.41
From its preamble, the Act clearly sought to; firstly,
deal with the debilitating institutional, technical and
financial challenges of the FD by upgrading the FD
into a semi-autonomous Forestry Commission. The
inherent idea in this provision was informed by the
fact that forestry problems in the country could not be
addressed without first strengthening the position,
capacity and autonomy of  the regulatory authority.42
Factors compounding forest loss and degradation
from the 1970s to 1999 presented more than enough
evidence to justify this approach.
Secondly, to broaden the legal scope of  forest
management from the narrow coverage of ‘demarcated
forests’ in the Act of 1973 to a broader coverage which
would include the establishment of Joint Forest
Management (JFM) areas, participation of local
communities, traditional institutions, non-
governmental organizations and the involvement of
other stakeholders in Sustainable Forest Management
(SFM). While maintaining a hegemony on the
Command side (through statutory rules), drafters of
this law were indirectly leading the GRZ to loosen up
on the Control side (regulatory aspects) of the CAC
approach. Forest management in the Act of 1999
would also cover such ecologically sensitive areas as
Protected Flora,43 and forests in local communities.44
3
THE FORESTS ACT NO 7 OF 1999
The turning point in the management of forests in
Zambia started with ideas laid down in the Zambia
Forestry Action Plan (ZFAP) 1998 to 2018; a twenty
year action plan meant to overhaul forest management
in the country.37 The ideas of  the ZFAP were
progressively developed into objectives of the Zambia
National Forestry Policy of 1998 and subsequently
coined into the object of  the Forests Act No.7 of
1999.38 Essentially, the Forests Act 1999 was a brain
child of  the ZFAP as well as conceived to be a national
strategy for fulfilling international obligations under
the UNCBD.39 Therefore, other than national issues
to which the Forests Act 1973 became inept, there was
an array of growing international pressure to which
natural resource law in Zambia needed to respond.
Bertha Osei-Hweidie alluded to this as one of the
influences that contributed to the development of
national environmental law and policy in Zambia.40
Maintaining a strong reliance on CAC regulation, the
Forests Act 1999 was enacted to:
establish the Zambia Forestry
Commission and define its functions;
to provide for the establishment of
National Forests, Local Forests and
joint forest management areas; to
provide for the participation of local
communities, traditional institutions,
non-governmental organizations and
other stakeholders in sustainable forest
management; to provide for the
conservation and use of  forests and
trees for the sustainable management
of forest ecosystems and biological
diversity; to provide for the
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37 Matakala (n 18) i.
38 ibid 1.
39 ibid 1.
40 Osei-Hweidie (n 27) 58.
41 The Forests Act No.7 of  1999, preamble.
42  Matakala (n 18) 7-8.
43  The Forests Act 1999, Part VII.
44  ibid s 2.
This automatically translated into an expanded scope
of forest management for the semi-autonomous
Forestry Commission.
Thirdly, it provided for the conservation and use of
forests and trees for the sustainable management of
ecosystems and biological diversity. This was built on
an implicit recognition of forests and their value not
just in terms of instrumental utility as sources of
timber but as natural habitats for a wide range of
biodiversity and for maintaining healthy ecosystems.
For the first time in Zambia’s forestry law, the concept
of sustainable development was introduced.
Fourthly, the law was also meant to be a national
mechanism for fulfilling international obligations of
environmental law and domesticate internationally
recognized principles of environmental law such as
public participation and sustainable development
through the implementation of the Convention on
Wetlands of  International Importance Especially as
Water Fowl Habitat, the CBD and the Convention to
Combat Desertification in those Countries
Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification,
particularly in Africa. This signified an integrated
approach to forests and environmental management
owing to the interconnected and multi-faceted nature
of forests and environmental issues like loss of
biodiversity. As such, the Act was attempting to raise
the profile of environmental management in general
and forest protection in particular to an international
level.
Fifth, the law was to demonstrate regulatory
responsiveness following the ineffectiveness,
irresponsiveness and incoherence of the Forests Act
1973. Hence, the need to repeal the former. But above
all, the Forests Act 1999 sought to address two broad
categories of problems; (i) the institutional and
administrative challenges of the regulator, the FD in
particular, and in the forestry sector in general, and (ii)
the escalation of forest degradation and deforestation
trends in the country.
As legal drafting custom dictates in Zambia, the Forests
Act 1999 was to provide for matters incidental to or
connected with the foregoing. The importance of  the
phrase ‘matters incidental to and/or connected with
the foregoing’ cannot be underplayed in regulatory
ethos. It points to the regulatory space that needs to
be occupied by different administrative procedures,
regulatory mechanisms and enforcement techniques
that need to be undertaken pragmatically in order to
fulfil the object of  the law. In essence, what needs to
be practically done to implement the theoretical
aspirations of the law so the law does not remain a
white elephant on paper? This is the meaning of
regulation from an empirical perspective.45 The
administrative procedures, the regulatory techniques
and approaches used to reach the targeted population
all constitute the regulatory infrastructure that the law
establishes. All this must fit into ‘matters incidental
to or connected with’ the spirit and the letter of the
law.
The Act was conceived as a brain child of  the ZFAP
1998-2018 and formed in the womb of the 1998
National Forestry Policy.46 This demonstrates the
Zambian approach of elaborating the values and
norms of the state through policy and use legislation
to enforce and protect the values. But the law never
came into force. Why, then, even discuss a law that
never came into force? That the roots of the Forests
Act 2015 are founded in the Forests Act 1999, it would
be incomplete to discuss the evolution of forest law
and regulation in Zambia without reference to the
defunct Forest Act 1999. Discussing it therefore, serves
to highlight the thinking of the policy and law-makers
of the time, to signify the problems the law sort to
address at the time, and to explicate the future the law
espoused. But inadequate flow of financial resources
to the FD was very symptomatic of all the problems
that culminated into failure to enforce the Act. This
factor partly explained the technical and capacity
debilitation in the department.47 There was a sheer
lack of multi-sectoral coordination for the
implementation of forestry programs outlined in the
ZFAP,48 and the political inertia towards the idea of
overhauling the sector was simply insurmountable
according to a renowned Forestry expert in Zambia,
Prof. Patrick Matakala.49
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46 Matakala (n 18) 4.
47 ibid 4.
48 ibid 4.
49 ibid 8.
Failure to enforce the Forests Act 1999 created a legal
conundrum from 1999 to 2015. The country was forced
to fall back on the repealed Act of 1973 to regulate the
forestry sector whose problems had doubled since the
1980s. This was problematic in two ways: Firstly, the
trends of forest degradation and deforestation in the
country had tremendously increased, and secondly, the
institutional, administrative and technical capacity
challenges in the FD worsened. The Forests Act of
1973 was never designed to address any problem of
this sort. How, then, could it be relied upon to regulate
the troubled forestry sector beyond 1999? It is during
this time that Zambia began to make global headlines
for recording one of the highest deforestation rates in
the world. The reason was primarily because the entire
forest estate in the country became a de facto
unregulated open access area.50
Failure to implement the 1999 Act impeded the much
needed flow of financial resources to the sector as
donors and major forestry funders lost confidence in
the whole system. A case in point; on 26th of January
2006, the Finish Embassy announced a decision of
the Finish government to withhold funding meant to
operationalize the Forestry Commission until the GRZ
ironed out issues of  the law.51  Implicit in the rationale
of  the Finnish Government was the observation that
the ineffectiveness, irresponsiveness and the
incoherence of the law was underpinning forest loss
and degradation in the country. The Finnish
Government’s withdrawal of  funding fur ther
compounded the FD’s institutional and technical
debilitation from which the department still grapples
to recover to this day. Professor Patrick Matakala
observes, in particular, that the failure to operationalize
the semi-autonomous Forestry Commission as
proposed in the Forests Act 1999 left the department
with a demotivated cadre of staff (most of whom
left) and shunned by the sector’s traditional funders.52
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THE FORESTS ACT NO 4 OF 2015
In general, the Forests Act 2015 is an off-shoot of the
defunct Forests Act 1999. With a change of
government in 2011, new energy was generated to
reinvigorate the legal and policy reforms in the forestry
sector. The Forests Act of 1999 was revised and sent
back to Parliament as Forestry Bill of 2012. For three
years, the Bill was politically contested mainly because
of the financial implications the semi-autonomy
Forest Commission would bring to the fore.53 To a
large extent, however, the Act of 1999 was left intact
other than the deletion of provisions establishing the
semi-autonomous Forestry Commission. Ironically,
the functions stipulated for the Forest Commission
were also left intact while the Forest Commission itself
was deleted. This meant that the FD was to take over
the statutory functions of the Forestry Commission.
Ultimately, all contested issues emanating from the
Forests Act 1999 narrowed down to a latent desire for
maintaining the hegemony of CAC in what was
eventually enacted as the Forests Act 2015.
4.1 The Spirit of the Law
An Act to provide for the establishment
and declaration of National Forests,
Local Forests, Joint Forest
Management (JFM) areas, botanical
reserves, private forests and
community forests; provide for the
participation of local communities,
local authorities, traditional institutions,
non-governmental organizations and
other stakeholders in SFM; provide for
the conservation and use of  forests and
47
50 ibid 31.
51 Lusaka Times, ‘Finland Withholds Forestry Commission
Funds Because Of Bad Laws’ Lusaka Times (26 January
2006) <http://www.lusakatimes.com/2009/01/26/
finland-withholds-forestry-commission-funds-because-
of-bad-law/>.
52 Matakala (n 18) 20. 53  ibid 14-15.
trees for the sustainable management
of forest ecosystems and biological
diversity; establish the Forest
Development Fund; provide for the
implementation of the UNFCCC,
CITES, the Convention on Wetlands
of International Importance, especially
as Water Fowl Habitat, the UNCBD in
those Countries experiencing Serious
Drought and/or Desertification,
particularly in Africa and any other
relevant international agreement to
which Zambia is a party; repeal and
replace the Forests Act 1999; and
provide for matters connected with, or
incidental to, the foregoing.
Of particular significance to the expanded scope of
forest management are two new entrants into the
system;
Firstly, the introduction of  private forests is an open
door for the participation of the private sector in
forestry. While this door was only slightly open in the
Act of 1999 through the recognition of rights, title
and interests over land and trees, the business side of
it was disincentivized through the extension of CAC
regulation to felling, cutting and selling of forest
produce derived from private ownership using
licenses.54 In the Forests Act of 2015, the door for
private forestry is completely open from production
to trading. Forest produce from a registered private
forest may be exempted from felling, cutting and selling
licenses.55 But why ‘may it be’ rather than ‘shall it be’
exempted? This discretionary legal language depicts
the lingering effects of CAC regulation on forestry in
general. In particular, it shows the stretch of the
government arm on controlling forestry business even
on private land. In addition, the opportunity for
deregulation of private forestry is significantly widened
in the principle of  Presidential stewardship. Section
three excludes private forests from all the other
demarcated forests whose ownership of trees and
forest produce vests in the President. Ownership of a
tree and all forest produce derived from a registered
private forest is vested in the owner. This should be
the right that protects the owner when felling, cutting
and/or selling forest produce their private forest.
Secondly, the introduction of  Community Forest
Management (CFM) is informed by a recognition of
how important local communities are both to the
degradation and sustainable management of forests.
Designers of this Act, particularly of the Act of 1999,
were cognizant of the fact that lessons of neglecting
local communities out of forest management in 1973
were too huge to be repeated. Equally important is
the fact that the conflict of jurisdiction over land and
forests between the FD and traditional Chiefs was so
daunting that it needed a legally supported solution.56
A specific Statutory Instrument (S.I) regulating CFM
was issued in 2018 and basically established three things;
(i) rights and obligations of the communities to
engage in CFM, (ii) the procedural mechanism for the
communities to embark on in seeking these rights,
and (iii) the community institutional framework
required for engaging in CFM. With the rights granted
under the S.I, communities receive the power and duty
to manage demarcated forests in their communal
localities,57 and acquired the authority to restrict access
to those forests.58
A Community Forest Management Group (CFMG)
is required to be established and recognized for this
purpose, then designated as a community legal entity
in the chain of power from the Director of Forestry to
the local community.59  The CFMG is also required to
assist the Director of Forestry to control restricted
activities within an established community forest
area.60 But why must the community, through the
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54  The Forests Act 1999, s 38 (2).
55  The Forests Act 2015, s 27 (3).
56 Government of the Republic of Zambia, Report of the
Auditor General on Sustainable Forest Management 2012-
2015, vi.
57 The Forests (Community Forest Management
Regulations) S.I No. 11 of  2018, regulation 5.
58 ibid regulation 9 (3) a.
59 ibid regulation 5.
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CFMG, help the Director of  Forestry rather than the
Director help the community? This exposes the latent
regulatory culture that runs through the genetics or
the spirit of the law and regulation while the letter of
the law is ostensibly inclined towards deregulation.
Essentially, the CFM regulations are simply giving the
communities the right to undertake forest management
for, and on, behalf  of  the Director of  Forestry. The
Presidential stewardship principle is hereby delegated
to the Director of Forestry which merely devolves the
very essence of CAC regulation. This also explains the
huge amount of power and duty the Director possesses
in granting and/or revoking community rights
throughout the regulations.
Providing for the participation of local communities,
local authorities, traditional institutions, non-
governmental organizations and other stakeholders
in SFM brings three lessons to the fore:
Firstly, that the complexity of  forest degradation and
deforestation in the country depicts national
socioeconomic development challenges of the many
poor and jobless Zambians.61 This means that no
single national institution or regulatory body, by itself
or on its own, can claim to be adequately positioned to
manage drivers of deforestation in the forestry sector.
Behind this provision, policy and law-makers do
concede the fact that the FD is too inadequate to
manage the entire forest estate in the country. Each of
the institutions, organizations, authorities and
stakeholders the law seeks to bring into forest
management have a specific influence on the drivers
of deforestation in the country either positively or
negatively, directly or indirectly, just as they have a
specific role to play in national development.
Secondly, and from a regulatory ethos, the multi-
stakeholder approach in the Forests Act 2015 is a
cardinal part of deregulation - otherwise referred to as
‘regulation in many rooms’.62  This is justified by the
complexity of socioeconomic challenges that
development in Zambia brings to the fore. Complexity
here refers to four particular scenarios of regulatory
failure as outlined by Julia Black; (i) the complex nature
of the interactions between state actors and the
socioeconomic needs of the targeted populations,63
(ii) the asymmetries of information in practical reality
given that, either all of these socioeconomic
complexities are unknown or may only be imperfectly
understood as different motivations ostensibly drive
people into the forests,64 (iii) the fragmentation of
knowledge between state regulators and the targeted
populations raises doubts as to how much the
regulators can claim to understand the huge forestry
estate they are mandated to regulate on their own?
Case in point; it is reported that the FD rarely gets
accurate and correct information about the harvesting
practices of the licensed concessionaries in the forests
due to lack of field staff on the ground;65 and (iv)
fragmentation in the exercise of power and control is
a challenge on its own.66 In a multi-party democracy
characterized by regional voting patterns across
different ethnic groupings, the GRZ cannot claim to
have a monopoly on the exercise of regulatory power
and social control everywhere in the country.
Consequently, the motivation for people to comply
with government CAC regulation is low and ultimately
leads to motivation failure. It is this vacuum of
motivational failure that other organizations,
institutions, authorities and stakeholders should
occupy in forest management.
Thirdly, while the Forests Act 1973 narrowly used ‘law’
as the sole font of regulation, the multi-stakeholder
approach in the Forests Act 2015 broadens the view
of  regulation beyond law. This illustrates the technical
conception of the term ‘regulation’ which means; the
use of a diversity of mechanisms, including rules, to
influence and control the flow of activities on the
ground.67 As such, the multi-stakeholder approach is
a direct result of the failures of CAC regulation whose
Law, Environment and Development Journal
49
61 Interview with Mr. Lishomwa Mulongwe, Chief
Forestry  Research Officer in the Forestry Department,
Kitwe (Zambia, 7 August 2019).
62  Black (n 33) 103-4.
63  ibid 107.
64  ibid 107.
65  Government of  the Republic of  Zambia (n 56) v.
66  Black (n 33) 107.
67  Bell and others (n 6) 229.
fails to capture them, to account for the financial flows
deriving from such activities and to evaluate their
impact on both the economy and forest resources.
This narrows down to the inadequate capacity of the
FD.
The Forests Act 1999 attempted to address this matter
by first, transforming the FD into a Commission and
secondly, by giving the Commission significant
amount of autonomy to run its own affairs, plan,
manage, and decide its own financial matters including
revenue collection. Contrary, the thinking of  the
Forests Act 2015 is reflected in the idea that the
department can and should solve much of its financial
problems through the Forest Development Fund.
Principally, monies into this fund should come from
voluntary contributions by any well-wishers,71  grants
from any source within and without the country as
the Minister may approve,72 and from interest arising
out of any investment of the fund.73
Imperative, however, is whether, in its current state,
the department is able to command enough confidence
and trust from within and without the country to
attract this money through the outlined sources? The
Auditor General’s report on SFM from 2012 to 2015
gives a glimpse into this matter. The report concludes,
inter alia, ‘there is inadequate investments in forest
plantations due to lack of funding and delayed funding
as a result, important activities such as planting and
weeding were done at the wrong time or not done at
all’.74 Reference to forest plantations in this report is
crucial because it is one of the major prescribed uses
of the money in the Forest Development Fund.75
But currently, the department is still grappling with
common caricature manifests in poorly targeted rules,
rigidity and ossification, under or over-enforcement,
all of which ultimately lead to unintended
consequences.68 Given its inherent rigidity, CAC
regulation is often unresponsive which makes it blunt
in the face of emerging issues unforeseen by the
drafters. To avert this danger, the GRZ has loosened
its grip on the control aspect (through multi-
stakeholder approach) while maintaining a tight grip
on the command aspect (use of statutory rules) of
CAC regulation. Therefore, the Forests Act 2015 was
well designed to be responsive to the escalating forest
loss and to be coherent to the socioeconomic needs
of the Zambian people at the same time. But has the
responsiveness and coherence of the law translated
into effectiveness?
Given the overpowering nature of CAC, the
effectiveness of the Forests Act largely depends on its
enforcement by the regulator, the FD, which is in dire
need of financial resources to undertake all its statutory
functions. The law provides for the establishment of
the Forest Development Fund as one of the
mechanisms to address lack of sustained financial
flows from the government and cooperating partners
into the department. Much of  the department’s
technical, resource and administrative incapacities are
attributable to this factor. Ironically, there is a lot of
money generated from forests in Zambia especially
through timber harvests and non-timber forest
produce like honey, devil’s claw, caterpillars and charcoal
production and trade.69 This is what counts towards
the 5.2 per cent contribution of forestry in general to
the country’s GDP.70 But many of  these forestry
activities are illegal and not monitored because the FD
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poor financial resources because its traditional funders
and cooperating partners lost confidence in the sector
following the failed implementation of the Forests
Act 1999,76  the piece of legislation which was designed
to address the institutional and administrative
challenges of the department. The failure to enforce
the Forests Act 1999 means the FD in the Forests Act
2015 continues to grapple with its statutory functions.
4.2 Function of  the Forestry
Department and its Director
Given the strength of CAC used throughout all the
three forest legislations from 1973 to 2015, the success
of controlling forest degradation and combating
deforestation in Zambia depends more on the ability
of the FD (the control) to undertake its statutory
functions prescribed in section five than on legal text
on paper (the command). It is not surprising that the
functions of the FD in section five are a ‘copy-and-
paste’ of the functions of the Forestry Commission
promulgated in the Act of 1999 as the one is birthed
out of the other. The department also has some
additional mandates in the Act of 2015 which were
not explicit in the 1999 Act. The institutional,
administrative and framework of the Commission in
the Act of 1999 was to be larger and more autonomous
than a department operating under a Permanent
Secretary in a Ministry. But the very functions which
the Commission should have undertaken under a
semi-autonomous structure have been lumped on a
department that runs on limited financial resources
and technical capacity with limited autonomy in the
Act of 2015. How does the incapacitated FD manage
to double its scope of work under the new mandate
when it has always been challenged to undertake a
narrower scope of work even before Act of 1999?
Further, the role of the Director of Forestry does not
reflect feasible reality. In practice, the Director of
Forestry must operate under the supervision of  the
Permanent Secretary in the Ministry as required and
guided by the operational rules of  the ministry. This
is part of the bottlenecks which the Forests Act of
1999 sort to bypass through its proposed institutional
reforms from a department to a Forestry Commission.
In theory however, the Forests Act of 2015 elevates
the Director not only as head of the Forestry
Department but mandates him/her with huge
responsibility, duty and power to administer the Act
in its entirety.77 This magnitude of  authority is only
comparable to that of a Director General of any other
statutory body in Zambia. In undertaking this duty,
the Director of Forestry does not have any other legal
entity or persons (like the Permanent Secretary) in
between him/her and the Minister within the chain
of legal mandate and power. It is discernable that the
ideal functions of the Director of Forestry were those
functions initially intended for the Director General
of the Forestry Commission in the repealed Act 1999.
Ultimately, the underwhelming functionality of  the
FD as well as the practical reality of the institutional
framework within which the Director of Forestry
operates on a daily basis have a huge bearing on the
enforcement of  the law.
4.3 Enforcement Gaps
Though undertaken just before the enactment of the
Forests Act of  2015, the Auditor General’s report of
SFM highlights a set of six problems in the sector.78
Only one of the six problems has been addressed
through the CFM Regulations of 2018. Meanwhile,
all the six problems highlighted in the report have
remained significant enforcement issues even after the
enactment of the Forests Act of 2015. The whole
76  Matakala (n 18) 26.
77 The Forests Act 2015, s 4 (2).
78 Government of the Republic of Zambia (n 56) v-vi.
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section, five prescribing the functions of  the FD, suffers
huge enforcement gaps as long as the department and
its crippling challenges remain unresolved. The
department’s mandate has been expanded without
correspondingly expanding its institutional, financial,
technical and human resource capacity. Allegorically, this
is like a disabled person who fails to carry a 10kg bag
because of  his disability. But he is given an additional
25kg bag to lift without first treating the disability.
The failure to control, manage, conserve and
administer National and Local Forests and botanical
reserves as stipulated in paragraph b of  subsection
two, section five, in particular, is fundamental in
explaining the current state of forest loss in Zambia.
Lack of Honorary forest officers as prescribed in section
six compounds the inadequacy of  staffing in the FD.
But it boils down to the fact that there is no money to
pay them. Without this cadre of field staff, the vast
forest estate in the whole country remains a de facto
open access area.79 Forest certification is still a challenge
in promoting SFM because the FD cannot yet enforce
provisions of  section nine, particularly, paragraph c of
subsection one. Forest certification comes with prior
processes that need to be in place beforehand; there
must be a certification criteria upon which the definition
of sustainability shall be based,80 and a set of
sustainability indicators and standards for
certification.81 These processes cannot happen in a
vacuum but through participatory stakeholder
engagement processes that require money. The FD is
not in any financial position to drive such processes.
Failure to enforce section twenty-five pertaining to the
prohibition of  certain activities in botanical reserves
explains the encroachments and indiscriminate cutting,
felling and excavations, fires and openings which the
paragraphs of subsection one are trying to control.
This is coupled with the failure to enforce part VI
(Regulation of Forest Produce) in general and section
forty nine in particular. An important part of regulating
forest produce is timber marking prescribed in Part
VII. There is a lot unmarked, thus illegal, timber felled
and conveyed from protected forests on our roads day
and night as the FD cannot be found everywhere all
the time.82
Part IX details the regulatory actions that a forestry
officer is mandated to undertake for the purpose of
the Act. While in theory, the law hereby gives
authorized officers power to enforce the law, there is a
huge shortage of  such officers on the ground in reality.
Section seventy four, subsection one and paragraph c
for instance, enacts that an authorized forest officer
may require any person found in the forest area who
has in that person’s possession forest produce to give
an account of the manner in which the person came in
possession of the forest produce…This provision
explicitly requires forest officers to take physical patrols
of  the vast forest estates in the country. But the reality
is that the said forest officers are, firstly, very few and
secondly, have no transport to patrol the massive forest
areas under their jurisdictions.
Essentially, all the enforcement actions prescribed
under Part IX are hands-on in nature. They require
transport for the forest officers to be physically on the
ground. But because of the dominant CAC regulatory
infrastructure around which the Act is built, it becomes
impractical to enforce the law (the command) when
the state regulatory body (the control) is itself
incapacitated to carry out its functions. In the final
analysis, the Act has an inbuilt ability to be responsive
to the escalating forest loss as well as being coherent to
the multiple socioecomic needs of the many poor and
jobless Zambians. The design of its rules, the extent
to which it provides for indirect regulation and the
recognition of stakeholders’ rights signify its coherence.
The Act is also designed with an inbuilt ability to be
responsive to, especially, the growing socioeconomic
needs of the Zambian society and unforeseen
emerging issues. The discretionary room in the section
79  Matakala (n 62) 31.
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five functions of the FD are deregulatory in nature
allowing for a wide scope of responsiveness to
different issues of the past, present and of the future
to promote sustainable forest management. Therefore,
the Act of  2015 is, in theory, coherent and its ability
for responsiveness is discernable. In practice however,
the Act can hardly be effective given the incapacities of
its main implementing agency - the FD. In sum, the
debilitating capacity of the FD makes the whole law
ineffective because there is still a huge gap between
what the law says in theory (legal text) and what
transpires in real life (social context).
5
CONCLUSION
The Forests Act 1973 was the first post-independence
national legislation to regulate forestry in Zambia.
Other than to simply assert national sovereignty and
authority over the forest estate, the Act was not
conceived as an instrument for solving any set of
forestry-related problems in the present or in the
future. The Government of the First Republic of
Zambia simply used the Act as legislative instrument
to assert its national value on the forest estate, a value
which was then expressed through a post-
independence culture of Command and Control. As
such, the legislation failed to be responsive to the
emerging problems of the 1980s. It was also deemed
incoherent to the growing socioeconomic needs of
the many poor and jobless Zambians particularly
because it was not designed for such. The Act failed to
respond to three broad set of problems; (i) the
escalating forest loss through deforestation and forest
loss, (ii) the increasing poor capacity of the Forests
Department and (iii) the jurisdictional conflict over
land and forests between the FD and traditional chiefs
under customary land.
The Forests Act 1999 was seen as a very progressive
legislation that would overhaul forest management in
Zambia by responding to the three forgoing
problems. The need to respond to the
aforementioned forestry problems and the desire to
make the regulatory system coherent to the many
Zambians were too huge to be ignored. Therefore,
key elements of the Act were the alterations of the
command (rules) and a reduction in the extents of the
control (regulatory approach) aspects of the
Command-and-Control regulation from the 1973
legislation. Establishment of a semi-autonomous
Forest Commission was the ‘elephant in the room’
where the deregulatory control aspects were concerned.
But the financial implications which the idea of a semi-
autonomous Forest Commission brought to the fore
veiled was used as an astute defense of the hegemony
on traditional values. Generally, the foundational spirit
of the Forests Act 1999 were an implicit challenge to
the dominant culture of command-and-control.
Consequently, the Act never came into force but was
later edited and resuscitated into a different statute in
order to restore the fundamental state culture on the
one hand, but exhibiting some elements of changing
values on the other hand. The resuscitated form of
the Act of 1999 became the Forests Act 2015.
By repealing the Act of 1999, the Forests Act of 2015
would have logically been expected to continue
addressing the three, broad set of problems which
the former sought to address. If the department was
already technically challenged in terms of capacity to
undertake the scope of the 1999 Act, what guarantee
is there that the department will manage to undertake
an expanded scope of work in the Forests Act 2015
while carrying forward the department’s old
institutional, administrative, technical, financial and
capacity challenges? The Forests Act 2015 not only
repeals the Act of 1999, it provides for the continuation
of the technical staff and administrative machinery of
the FD.83  Inevitably, all the capacity challenges of  the
department are thereby carried forward in an effort to
maintain a hegemony of the foundational culture of
Command-and-Control.
In summary, government’s underpinning idea for
natural resource management in Zambia has always
been defined by a need to assert authority and
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sovereignty over land and everything that stands on
the land. Government’s value of  forestry derives from
this idea, and it is also seen in the way the sector has
been managed through a culture of commanding and
controlling the sector from 1973 to 2015. Statutory
law is nothing but an instrument through which the
GRZ projects its culture of protecting and enforcing
its overt and/or covert values. This paper was not set
to argue whether this culture is good or bad, or whether
it is appropriate or not. The paper was set to analyze
the blind spot of a culture of Command and Control.
It is in this cultural blind spot that regulatory gaps
occur particularly because; in its attempts to preserve a
hegemony on its traditional values, the regulatory
culture fails to discern the dynamics of changing times.
In the process, the regulatory machinery becomes
irresponsive to the very mischief it was meant to cure,
incoherent to the values of the same society which
drives deforestation and forest degradation. Empirically
speaking, the legal/regulatory machinery is rendered
ineffective in practice.
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